We propose a distributed spectrum access algorithm for cognitive radio relay networks with multiple primary users (PU) and multiple secondary users (SU). The key idea behind the proposed algorithm is that the PUs negotiate with the SUs on both the amount of monetary compensation, and the amount of time the SUs are either (i) allowed spectrum access, or (ii) cooperatively relaying the PU's data, such that both the PUs' and the SUs' minimum rate requirement are satisfied. The proposed algorithm is shown to be flexible in prioritizing either the primary or the secondary users. We prove that the proposed algorithm will result in the best possible stable matching and is weak Pareto optimal. Numerical analysis also reveal that the distributed algorithm can achieve a performance comparable to an optimal centralized solution, but with significantly less overhead and complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio has been proposed as a promising technology to improve the spectral efficiency of wireless networks. This is achieved by allowing unlicensed secondary users (SU) to coexist with licensed primary users (PU) in the same spectrum. This coexistence is facilitated by spectrum access techniques, such as those involving an agreement between the PUs and SUs on an acceptable spectrum access strategy. The key idea is that the PUs are motivated to lease spectrum bands to the SUs in exchange for some form of compensation.
Monetary compensation has been well studied (see e.g., [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] ), with the predominant approach for spectrum access and performance analysis involving the use of tools from game theory. For example, [7] [8] [9] considered a non-cooperative game between the PUs and SUs, while [4, 6] considered a twostage leader-follower game. For these monetary payment schemes, the PUs are assumed to have sufficient spectrum for leasing to the SUs, such that their own performance requirements are not affected. Authors in [10] also have considered bilateral bargaining among PUs and SUs. In practice, however, the PUs may desire higher data rates than what its current spectrum can provide.
To allow for higher data rates, the use of cooperative relaying has emerged as a powerful technique due to its ability to exploit user diversity and provide high reliability and capacity in wireless networks [11] . This is achieved by the use of intermediate relay nodes to aid transmission between the source and destination nodes. The use of cooperative relaying is particularly advantageous when the direct link between the source and destination is weak, due to, for example, high shadowing.
In this paper, we consider a model where the SUs act as cooperative relays to assist the PUs' transmission in exchange for both spectrum access and monetary compensation, and thus the SUs are effectively providing both a monetary and performance compensation to the PUs. When only performance compensation is considered, this is commonly referred to as the overlay model, and various schemes have been proposed [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . However, these schemes considered the scenario where the increase in PU's performance does not necessarily translate into a satisfactory performance for the SUs, and in some cases, the SUs have limited spectrum access opportunities if the PUs have regular data to transmit [12, 17, 18] . This issue was addressed in [19, 20] , where a scheme was proposed which increased the PU's performance while simultaneously satisfying the SU's requirements. However, these papers [12] [13] [14] [19] [20] [21] considered a simplified scenario with only one PU, and did not consider monetary compensation. Besides, some works also considered a simplified scenario with multiple PUs and only one SU.
In this paper, we propose a spectrum access strategy for a more general cognitive radio relay network with multiple competitive PUs and multiple competitive SUs under the overlay model, which guarantees a minimum rate requirement for all matched PUs and SUs. We define a PU and SU as matched if the SU cooperatively relays the PU's data, in exchange for spectrum access and monetary compensation.
The majority of current game theory techniques in cognitive radio, which involve multiple PUs and multiple SUs focus on a framework where only users of the same type are the primary decision makers, i.e., either the PUs or the SUs are involved in the game to determine access to the spectrum resources [22] . However, in this approach, the decision makers do not take into account the performance metric of the non-decision users, and thus will lead to unacceptably low performance for these users. To obtain better performance, it is thus desirable for the spectrum access strategy to get all users involved in the decision making process, and thus the interactions between the PUs and SUs should be taken into account, along with the varying performance requirements of these users.
Moreover, what is not actually captured by the normal and basic game and auction models is the fact that different spectrum resources and relaying services that are offered by PUs and SUs causes different performance levels for the SUs and PUs respectively due to random phenomena such as:
fading, noise, and shadowing. More specifically, each PU and each SU supplies a spectrum and relaying service with a specific and unique rate performance for a SU and a PU respectively. Thus to model such a complex interaction between multiple spectrum suppliers and multiple relaying service suppliers, a more flexible tool is required. Current algorithms in cognitive radio literature addressing this issue have thus far focused on centralized-approaches, e.g., the double-auction approach in [23] .
This approach is clearly not desirable in practice due to the significant amount of overhead required in centralized coordination.
In this paper, we develop a new distributed spectrum access framework based on auction and matching theory. The proposed distributed algorithms will match the PUs with the SUs based on a preference list, which is unique to each user, and based on both monetary and performance compensations. Matching users belonging to two different groups (e.g., a PU group and a SU group) based on preference lists has its roots in the dynamic matching theory [24, 25] , which was used to match users based on a preference list, and recently applied to wireless resource allocation problems [26, 27] . However, the algorithms based on the classic matching theory did not consider the possibility of dynamic negotiation between the PUs and the SUs with time-varying requirements, which is desirable for users in next generation wireless access networks.
To address this issue, we propose a novel dynamic negotiation algorithm based on multi-item auction theory [25, 28] and matching theory that requires an intelligent negotiation mechanism, where the PUs and the SUs choose between either prioritizing monetary or performance compensation. Our algorithm determines the matched pairings between PUs and SUs, such that the SU will provide monetary compensation, and relay its paired PU's data in exchange for spectrum access. The key idea behind the algorithm is that the PUs negotiate with the SUs on the amount of monetary compensation, in addition to the time the SUs are either (i) allowed access to the spectrum, or (ii) cooperatively relaying the PU's data, such that both the PUs' and the SUs' minimum rate requirement are satisfied.
We then analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm, showing that it results in the best possible stable matching, and is weak Pareto optimal. We introduce a utility function, which incorporates both the rate and monetary factors. We demonstrate through numerical analysis that the algorithm can achieve utilities (i) comparable to the utilities achieved by an optimal centralized algorithm, and (ii) significantly greater than the utilities achieved by a random matching algorithm that is mixed with a basic negotiation, while also being able to accomplish a high number of matchings with low overhead and complexity.
When only the rate is important, and monetary compensation is not a priority, we show that our algorithm is flexible in terms of prioritizing either the PUs or SUs, by a simple manipulation of global parameter values. This is in contrast to [29] , in which this design flexibility was not achievable. Note that considering this extra monetary parameter is a significant extension to the algorithm presented in [29] , as considerable changes to the algorithm are required. Moreover, in contrast to [29] , we also present additional analyses including (i) proving that our algorithm results in the best stable matching over all possible stable matchings, (ii) providing an explicit upper bound expression for the number of iterations required for convergence of the proposed algorithm, (iii) presenting an explicit expression for the overhead and (iv) analyzing the complexity performance of our proposed scheme compared to a baseline centralized scheme. Finally, we show that the PUs, which utilize the SUs for cooperative relaying achieve a rate greater than what it would achieve without cooperative relaying, i.e, direct transmission, and thus motivates their participation in the proposed algorithm. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we first describe our system model. We then formulate the optimization problem we are trying to solve in Section III, and present a distributed solution to this problem in Section IV. Finally, we analyze the performance and the implementation aspects of our proposed algorithm in Section V. For convenience, Table I provides a description of some of the parameter values we will be utilizing in this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an overlay cognitive radio wireless network, comprising of L PU PU transmitter
i=1 pairs, with the th pair having a rate requirement of R PU ,req , and with each pair occupying a unique spectrum band of constant size. In the same network, there are
pairs, with the qth pair having a rate requirement of R SUq,req , and seeking to obtain access to one spectrum band occupied by a (PT, PR) pair. We Each PT attempts to grant spectrum access to a unique (ST, SR) pair, as determined by the various matching algorithms, described in Sections III and IV, in exchange for (i) the ST cooperatively relaying the PT's data to the corresponding PR, and (ii) monetary compensation. In particular, without loss of generality (w.l.o.g), let us consider (PT , PR ), whose transmission is relayed by ST q during a fraction β ,q (0≤β ,q ≤1) of T , whilst also receiving a fraction ξ ,q (0≤ξ ,q ≤1) of C from ST q , as depicted in Figure 1 . We will refer to ξ ,q and β ,q as the price and time-slot allocation numbers, respectively, whose exact values will be determined by the matching algorithms described in Sections III and IV.
During the cooperative relaying stage in the initial β ,q T time-slots, a fraction τ ,q (0<τ ,q <1) is first allocated for PT to broadcast its signal to ST q and PR , thus occurring in the first β ,q τ ,q T time-slots. In the subsequent β ,q (1 − τ ,q )T time-slots, ST q cooperatively relays the signal from PT to PR . PR and then applies maximum ratio combining (MRC) to the signal received from PT in the first β ,q τ ,q T time-slots, and the signal received from ST q in the subsequent β ,q (1 − τ ,q )T time-slots. After this cooperative relaying stage, PT ceases transmission, allowing ST q to transmit to SR q over the spectrum occupied by (PT , PR ) in the final (1 − β ,q )T time-slots.
In this paper, we consider the amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying protocol, due to its simple and practical operation, and thus set τ ,q = 1 2
. We note, however, that the proposed algorithm is applicable to any relaying protocol, such as the decode-and-forward or compress-and-forward protocol. The AF gain at ST q is chosen such that its instantaneous transmission power is constrained to P SUq .
A. Utility Functions
To evaluate the performance of each (PT, PR) and (ST, SR) pair, we consider the utility function, which comprises of both rate and monetary factors. The utility function is a concept, which shows the level of satisfaction of a user by combining all parameters to a single number. It represents the net losses and gains of a user [30] . These parameters can be of different types, and by using suitable weights can be combined together.
Utility functions have been widely used in wireless literature to solve various radio resource management problems [31] [32] [33] . These papers include combining different parameters, such as price, delay, signal-to-interference and noise ratio, power, rate, error performance, into a single number. Specifically in cognitive radio, the utility function have been used in [1, 4, 9, [34] [35] [36] .
For (PT , PR ), the achievable instantaneous rate is given by [11] 
where
is the receive signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) at PR of the direct signal from PT ,
is the equivalent receive SNR of the relayed signal at PR from Similar to the utility functions defined in [9, 12, [34] [35] [36] we define
wherec∈R + , is a variable with unit defined as: rate per unit monetary value.
For (ST q , SR q ), the achievable instantaneous rate is given by
where 
wherek∈R + is a variable with unit defined as: rate per unit monetary value. We consider a general case wherec andk have the same units, but their values may be different. This is to allow for flexibility in the algorithm design, as will be discussed in Section V.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we describe the optimization problem we aim to address. To proceed, we introduce some notations. We first define the primary and secondary user sets, respectively, as P= 
In the above definition, (a) implies that a PU is matched to a single SU or no PU, i.e., μ(PU )=∅, (b) implies that a SU is matched to a single PU or no source, i.e., μ(SU q )=∅, (c) implies that if PU is matched to SU q , then SU q is also matched to PU and m ,q =1,
then SU q is not matched and (e) implies that if m ,q =0 then PU is not matched .
We also define an L PU × L SU price allocation matrix G with g i,j =ξ i,j , and an L PU × L SU time-slot allocation matrix B with b i,j =β i,j , and where
We denote the price and timeslot allocation matrices with continuous elements as G cont and B cont respectively. Mathematically, this implies that the elements of G cont and B cont , respectively take values from the sets {g
Now the main goal for each primary and secondary user is to ensure their minimum rate requirements are satisfied. When this is achieved, the secondary goal is to maximize their utility functions.
Note that the secondary goals for the primary and secondary users cannot be achieved simultaneously, as a higher utility for the primary user will result in a lower utility for the matched secondary user, and vice-versa. It is natural, and often considered in literature (see e.g. [34] ), to give preference to the primary users, i.e. focus on maximizing the primary users' utility. As such, we now present the optimization problem:
Conditions (a) and (b) ensure that the minimum required rate for the PUs and SUs are satisfied 1 , respectively. Condition (c) ensures that the SUs always receive a positive utility. Conditions (d) and (e) respectively ensure that each PU will only be matched with one SU, and vice-versa. Finally, conditions (f ) and (g), respectively, ensure that the price and time-slot allocation values are kept within their bounds.
In practice, a centralized controller is required to solve the optimization problem in (8) . However, there are three key issues regarding this approach:
• Overhead: The centralized controller will require the feedback on channel conditions and minimum rate requirements from each primary and secondary user. Moreover, after the optimization problem is solved, the resultant matching between PUs and SUs and price and time-slot allocation numbers will then have to be transmitted to the corresponding users. The amount of overhead required for this increases with the number of users, and can be quite high, rendering it impractical.
• Complexity: The optimization problem is non-linear, and requires an exhaustive search over all possible matching, price and time-slot allocation combinations. Such a problem is known to be NP-hard [5] .
• Selfish Users: We assume all the primary and secondary users are selfish 2 , which means their goal is to always maximize their own utilities, then the outcome of the optimization problem may not be in the best interests of at least one of these users. Selfishness is considered as an inherent behavior of distributed and intelligent users. There are also privacy issues for which a centralized approach may not be ideal.
To address these issues, we propose a distributed low-complexity algorithm, which accounts for selfish users. As we will demonstrate in Section V, our algorithm can achieve a performance close to the solution of the optimization problem in (8) for practical system parameters.
IV. PROPOSED DISTRIBUTED MATCHING ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe the proposed algorithm, which determines spectrum access for each (PT, PR) and (ST, SR) pair.
A. Received SNR Assumptions
We first describe two scenarios that will be considered in the proposed algorithm, characterized by different assumptions on the received SNR at the transmitters and receivers.
1) Complete Received SNR:
In the first scenario, PT has perfect knowledge of the instantaneous
. Moreover, ST q has perfect knowledge of the instantaneous received SNRs in the expressions Γ SR q,
. As such, PT and ST q are able to respectively calculate their instantaneous rates in (1) and (5).
2) Partial Received SNR:
In the second scenario, PT has knowledge of the average received SNRs in the term For both complete and partial received SNR scenarios, note that each PT and ST does not have knowledge of the instantaneous received SNRs corresponding respectively to the other PTs and STs.
Moreover, the instantaneous received SNRs can be obtained through standard channel estimation techniques.
B. Users Preference Lists
Each PT has a preference list of STs which can cooperatively relay the PT's message such that it obtains a rate greater than its minimum rate requirement. In particular, the preference list for PT is given by (10) for the complete received SNR scenario, and the conditions (11) for the partial received SNR scenario. The function φ (·) also satisfies the ordering
, implying that the first ST in the list provides the largest utility. Moreover, K is the number of (ST, SR) pairs satisfying these conditions. Similarly, each ST has a preference list of PTs which, if it transmits in the spectrum band occupied by the (PT, PR) pair in the list, obtains a rate greater than its minimum rate requirement and a utility greater or equal to zero. In particular, the preference list for ST q is given by
and
with the ordering
The ordering thus implies that the first PT in the list provides the largest utility. Moreover, V is the number of (PT, PR) pairs satisfying these conditions.
In practice, the instantaneous channels can be measured by utilizing common channel estimation techniques [37] . One possibility is for this channel estimation to be sent via control channels, as considered in [1, 12] .
C. Proposed Algorithm to Determine the Matching, Price and Time-slot Allocation Matrices
The key idea of the proposed algorithm is that each (PT, PR) pair trades with the (ST, SR) pair, which provides the highest utility, through both cooperative relaying and monetary payment. This trading will be done by negotiating on the price and time-slot allocation numbers
We say PT makes an offer of (ξ ,q , β ,q ) to ST q to imply that PT is willing to allow ST q to transmit, in exchange for ST q (i) cooperatively relaying PT 's message with time slot allocation number β ,q and, (ii) providing a monetary payment with price allocation number ξ ,q .
The specific details of the main algorithm are given in Note that the PUU provides an intelligent response for each PU after its offer is rejected by a SU.
To summarize the main algorithm (MA), each PT will first make an offer to the ST, which is first in its preference list (MA-Step 2-1). The ST will then check if the offering PT is in it's preference list (MA-Step 2-2-1). If it is, and the ST is already matched with another PT, the ST has two choices: (a) if the offering PT can provide a better utility than the ST's current matching, then the ST will reject its current matching in favor of the new matching (MA-Step 2-2-1-a-i), or (b) if the offering PT can not provide a better utility than the ST's current matching, the ST will reject the PT's offer (MA-Step 2-2-1-a-ii). If the ST is not matched, then the ST will be matched with the offering PT (MA-Step 2-2-1-b). If the offering PT is not in the ST's preference list, the ST will reject the offering PT (MA-Step 2-2-2). The algorithm will then repeat this procedure with each PT until no more matchings are possible.
Note that if the ST rejects a PT, then the proposal update unit (PUU) will be activated, and the PT will either (i) decrease its price allocation number by a price step number δ (PUU-3), or (ii) Step 2-1 for each PT which is not matched, i.e., go to Step 2-1 with PT being the PT corresponding to the first entry in MATCH.
Step 4: End of the algorithm decrease its time slot allocation number by a time slot-step number (PUU-4), depending on which option maximizes the PT's utility, and assuming a positive price and time-slot allocation number and the minimum data rate requirement for the PT is satisfied.
We observe that the proposed algorithm produces a matching, price allocation, and time-slot allocation matrix. Note that the price and time-slot allocation matrix have non-zero entries, which take values from a discrete set, in contrast to the continuous set considered in the optimization problem in (8) . This is due to the update procedure, where the price and time-slot allocation numbers change according to the price and time-slot step numbers δ and . We denote the price and timeslot allocation matrices with discrete elements corresponding to the particular ξ init , β init , δ and values as G disc (ξ init , δ) and B disc (β init , ) respectively. Mathematically, the elements of
and B disc (β init , ) respectively take values from the sets {g
V. PERFORMANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS
We now analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm, and consider related implementation issues. We first present some assumptions we will be considering in the analysis. To demonstrate that the (PT, PR) pairs are motivated to participate in the proposed algorithm, we set the minimum rate requirement of each (PT, PR) pair to be the rate of the direct PT to PR link. This is given for (PT , PR ) by R PT ,PR =T log 2 1 + Γ Dir PR . In this paper, we thus set R PU ,req =R PT ,PR .
We assume all channels experience Rayleigh fading, that randomly distributed as ∼CN (0, 1) and are constant during the duration of the proposed algorithm and subsequent T transmission timeslots. This is a common assumption for auction based and iterative resource allocation algorithms in wireless networks [38] [39] [40] .
Moreover, the PTs and PRs are located on opposite sides of a square of length two, and thus agree on these values, they will cooperate, otherwise there is no cooperation.
We observe that such a random matching requires a centralized approach, and is an upper bound to a completely distributed random matching with no overhead. However, this is sufficient for comparison purposes with the proposed algorithm. Note that the centralized and random matching algorithm represent the two extremes in the amount of overhead and complexity required for any algorithm.
For all figures, unless indicated otherwise the 'Centralized' curves are generated by using (8), the 'Proposed (complete SNR)' curves are generated as described in Section IV-A1, the 'Proposed (partial SNR)' curves are generated as described in Section IV-A2, and the 'RMBN' curves are generated based on the random match basic negotiation methods as previously described in this Section.
A. Incentive Analysis for Selfish and Rational Users
A common and realistic assumption in cognitive radio networks is that the primary and secondary users are selfish and rational (see e.g., [1] and [30] ). Selfishness implies that users compete with each other to maximize their individual utility function, with no regard for other user's utility, while rationality implies that users always make decisions to increase their utility. It is thus important for the proposed algorithm to provide, incentive for the users to participate in the proposed algorithm, by taking into account the selfish and rational nature of the users. 
1) Accounting for Selfish Users Through
or U SU q,μ † (sq ) (ξ μ † (sq),q , β μ † (sq),q )<0.
A matching μ is blocked by pair (p , s q ) if (i) it is not blocked by individual p and s q , and (ii)
there exists a ξ ,q and β ,q such that p and s q can both achieve a higher utility if they were matched together, as opposed to their current matching under μ. The latter condition, thus mathematically implies that
A matching μ is then defined as stable, under the price and time-slot allocation matrices 5 G and B, if it is not blocked by any individual or any pair. Given this definition, we present the following theorem.
Theorem 1:
The proposed algorithm in Section IV-C produces a stable matching, under
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 is important because it states that the proposed algorithm results in a matching, where any matched (PT, PR) and (ST, SR) pair will not both achieve a higher utility than if they were to respectively partner with any other (ST, SR) and (PT, PR) pair.
2) Accounting for Rational Users Through Utility Maximization:
It is also important that the proposed algorithm takes into account the rational nature of the users. This first means that each PU and SU will obtain at least a better utility if they participated in the algorithm compared to if they were unmatched. This is equivalent to one of the stable matching conditions; that the matching is not blocked by an individual, and was proved in Theorem 1. The second is that at each iteration of the algorithm, each PU and SU should always choose the user, which provides the highest utility. This can be directly observed in MA-Step 2-1 for each PU, and MA-Step 2-2-1-a-i and MA-Step 2-2-1-b for each SU. This implies that none of these matched selfish PUs and SUs have any incentive to deviate from the matching produced by the proposed algorithm.
B. Utility Performance
We now investigate the utility performance of the proposed algorithm. To do this, we first present the following lemma:
The utility for every (PT, PR) pair in the stable matching, produced by the proposed algorithm in Section IV-C, is greater than or equal to the utility obtained through a stable matching produced by any algorithm, under G disc (ξ init , δ) and B disc (β init , ).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Lemma 1 thus indicates that our algorithm produces the best stable matching, out of every possible stable matchings, under G disc (ξ init , δ) and B disc (β init , ).
A natural question now arises as to how our algorithm performs when compared with non-stable matchings. To answer this, we first show that our algorithm produces a weak Pareto optimal matching, denoted by μ Pareto . A weak Pareto optimal matching is defined as a matching where there exists at least one matched (PT, PR) pair under μ Pareto , which obtains a utility at least greater than any other matching, stable or non-stable. Given this definition, we present the following theorem:
Theorem 2: The proposed algorithm in Section IV-C is weak Pareto optimal, under G disc (ξ init , δ) and B disc (β init , ).
Proof: See Appendix C.
Theorem 2 indicates there exists at least one matched (PT, PR) pair under the proposed algorithm that achieves a utility at least greater than the utility achieved under a non-stable centralized optimal algorithm, under G disc (ξ init , δ) and B disc (β init , ). This optimal algorithm is similar to the algorithm
In fact, the proposed algorithm can achieve a utility for every matched (PT, PR) pair very close to the centralized optimal algorithm in (8), even under G cont (ξ init , δ) and B cont (β init , ). This can be observed in Figure 2 , which plots the average sum-utility of all matched (PT, PR) pairs vs. timeslot step number for the proposed algorithm, the centralized algorithm in (8) algorithm. Note that the average sum-utility corresponds to the sum over all utilities achieved by the matched (PT, PR) pairs, averaged over the channel realizations, and given by
, where P μ corresponds to all the (PT, PR) pairs matched under μ.
We first observe in Figure 2 that for the proposed algorithm, the complete and partial received SNR scenarios achieve very similar performance, despite different channel assumptions. We next observe that the proposed algorithm (i) achieves a sum-utility comparable with the sum-utility of the centralized algorithm for sufficiently small , and (ii) performs significantly better than the RMBN algorithm. For example, when the time-slot step number =0.1 and L SU =10, we observe that the proposed algorithm with complete and partial received SNR achieves respectively (i) ≈97% of the sum-utility of the centralized algorithm, and (ii) ≈193% sum-utility increase compared to the RMBN algorithm. 
=1 ,k=15 and α=4.
C. Rate Performance
As observed in Section IV-C and Figure 2 , the proposed algorithm's primary focus is on maximizing the PU's sum-utility, while simultaneously satisfying both the PU's and SU's minimum rate requirement. However, some networks may require that (i) only the rate is important and monetary factors are not a consideration, and (ii) the SUs also prefer a higher rate, greater than their minimum data rate requirement. For such networks, the proposed algorithm is flexible in adapting to these design needs.
In particular, observe from (4) that increasingc has the effect of increasing the contribution of the monetary value in the (PT, PR)'s utility function. As observed in the Proposal Update Unit, this has the effect of the PUs choosing to offer a lower time-slot allocation number, rather than a lower price allocation number, to the SUs. This will subsequently result in a higher rate for the SUs, at the expense of a lower rate for the PUs. Thus the parameterc can be used to control the rates of the PUs and SUs, in accordance with specific system requirements. PUs' rate per monetary value,c Average sum−rate of matched SUs, This can be observed in Figures. 3 and 4 , which respectively plots the average sum-rate of all matched (PT, PR) pairs vs.c, and the average sum-rate of all matched (ST, SR) pairs vs.c, for the complete received SNR scenario. Note that the average sum-rate of all matched (PT, PR) pairs corresponds to the sum over all rates achieved by the matched (PT, PR) pairs, averaged over the channel realizations, and is given by R PU Σ ,μ = ∈Pμ E R ,μ † ( ) (β ,μ † ) , where P μ corresponds to all the (PT, PR) pairs matched under μ. A similar definition can be made for the sum-rate of the matched (ST, SR) pairs, denoted R SU Σ ,μ . For comparison, we also plot the sum-rate achieved by a centralized optimal algorithm. In particular, in Figure 3 , the centralized algorithm produces a sumrate, which maximizes the total sum-rate of all (PT, PR) pairs, and given by substitutingc=0 into the optimal algorithm produced from (8) . In Figure 4 , the centralized algorithm produces a sum-rate which maximizes the sum-rate of all (ST, SR) pairs, and is formulated in a way similar to (8) in the optimization arg max
subject to the conditions in (8) .
We observe in Figures. 3 and 4 that R PU Σ ,μ decreases withc, while R SU Σ ,μ increases withc, as expected. This shows the flexibility of our algorithm in adapting to different primary and secondary user priority levels. Whenc is low, we observe in Figure 3 that the sum-rate of the matched (PT, PR) pairs of our proposed algorithm achieves a high percentage of the optimal algorithm and significantly greater than the RMBN algorithm. Similarly, whenc is high, we observe in Figure 4 that the sum-rate of the matched (ST, SR) pairs of our proposed algorithm achieves a high percentage of the optimal algorithm and significantly greater than the RMBN algorithm.
D. Total Number of Matchings
The total number of matched (PT, PR) and (ST, SR) pairs is also an important consideration of any matching algorithm, and is proportional to the total number of users which can achieve their minimum rate requirements. Figure 5 shows the percentage of matched (PT, PR) pairs vs. the SU's
We observe that the percentage of matched (PT, PR) pairs increases with γ SU and L SU , due to the higher achievable rates that the matched (PT, PR) pairs can achieve through cooperative relaying. Remarkably, we observe that the proposed scheme can achieve a very high matching percentage at high SNR even when L SU =2,
i.e., ≥80% when γ SU ≥20 dB. Moreover, the proposed algorithm delivers a percentage of matched users comparable with the centralized algorithm, and significantly greater than the RMBN algorithm.
Note that as the minimum rate requirement for the PUs is equal to the rate of their corresponding direct link transmission without cooperative relaying, Figure 5 thus indicates that the PUs are well motivated to participate in the trading framework with the SUs.
In practice, the unmatched PTs will transmit directly to their corresponding PRs and thus (PT , PR ) will achieve the rate R PT ,PR . However, the unmatched STs will not be able to transmit at all. To remedy this, various modifications to the proposed algorithm can be made, which are the subject of future work such as integrating a fairness mechanism into the algorithm so each ST has a turn transmitting, though at different times.
E. Convergence
We will now analyze the convergence behavior of the proposed algorithm, as shown in the following theorem:
Theorem 3: The number of iterations required for the proposed algorithm to converge is upper bounded by:
Proof: See Appendix D.
Theorem 3 implies that the proposed algorithm converges after a finite number of iterations, and that this number is dependent on different parameters. For example, we clearly see that the number of iterations for convergence decreases with and δ, and increases with ξ init and β init .
F. Overhead
The proposed algorithm is distributed, and thus incurs significantly less overhead and complexity compared to centralized algorithms. An exact analysis of the amount of overhead and complexity is difficult, due to the dependency on a number of system parameters, such as the minimum sumrate requirements, the price and time-slot step-numbers and the initial price and time-slot allocation numbers. We can however, find an expression for the upper bound on the maximum number of communication packets between the PTs adn the STs, given in the following theorem:
Theorem 4: The number of communication packets between the PTs and the STs required in the proposed algorithm is upper bounded by
where where a 1 , a 2 ∈R + and F =max{L PU , L SU }.
Proof: See Appendix E.
We observe in (17) that the amount of overhead, and thus the number of iterations, decreases with and δ. This is confirmed in Figure 6 , which plots the total number of communication packets exchanged between each PT and all the STs it communicates with, vs. time-slot step number , with the same parameters used in Figure 2 . We see that the total number of communication packets converge to a constant at sufficiently high . This is because if is sufficiently large, the time-slot allocation numbers are updated in the algorithm in such a way that the preference lists for each y for different number of secondary users L SU , where y is a realization of Y . We observe that the proposed algorithm can achieve low overhead with high probability in various practical scenarios.
For example, when L SU =6, we observe that 90% of the time, a maximum of only 15 communication packets are exchanged between the PUs and the SUs.
Figures. 2 and 6, and (17) reveal that can be designed to ensure an acceptable amount of overhead and achievable rate. In particular, we observe from (17) and Figure 6 numbers which can be offered to the (ST, SR) pairs from the (PT, PR) pairs. This will result in a lower utility for the (PT, PR) pairs, and increase the chance the STs will reject any offer made.
This can be observed in Figure 2 , which illustrates a tradeoff between performance and overhead.
A similar argument can be made for decreasing ξ init and β init . In practice, each PU can adaptively adjust it's time-slot step number based on (i) the acceptable sum utility of PUs in Figure 2 and (ii) the tolerable average number of required communication packets in Figure 6 .
We note that the packet length required for communication between the PTs and the STs is very short. In particular, assuming that ξ init , β init , δ and are initially known to all users, each PT is only required to send one bit to the first ST in its preference list indicating an offer, and the corresponding ST only needs to send one bit back to the offering PT indicating either acceptance or rejection. The required time for the proposed algorithm execution is thus very small. Specifically, if high speed control channels such as 802.11 are used, the average time for execution is in the order of 100-200 nsec [42] . As demonstrated in Figure 6 , the total number of communication packets for each PT can be designed to be reasonably small, and thus given the short packet lengths, the total running time and amount of overhead from the proposed algorithm can be quite small.
G. Complexity
We now present a lemma for the complexity of the centralized, proposed and RMBN algorithms:
Lemma 2: The complexity of the centralized algorithm is given by
of the proposed algorithm by O (L PU L SU ), and of the RMBN algorithm by O (L PU ).
Proof: See Appendix F.
We observe that the centralized method has a significantly larger complexity than both the proposed and randomized algorithm. Its complexity is increasing exponentially with the number of primary and secondary users. In contrast, the proposed algorithm complexity only increases linearly with the number of primary or secondary users.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a distributed algorithm for spectrum access, which guarantees that the PUs' and SUs' rate requirements are satisfied. Our algorithm hinges on a trading framework between the PUs and SUs, where the PUs and SUs negotiate on combined time-slot and monetary compensation. Time slot allocation numbers determine the amount of transmission time dedicated for SU transmission, and the length of time the SUs will cooperative relay the PUs' data. The price allocation numbers express the amount of monetary compensation that SU provide for PUs in exchange of spectrum usage. The proposed algorithm, was based on a dynamic bilateral negotiation between the PUs and SUs that resulted in a stable outcome. We proved that the proposed algorithm results in the best possible stable matching and is weak Pareto optimal. A numerical analysis also revealed that the distributed algorithm achieves a performance comparable to an optimal centralized algorithm, but with significantly less overhead and complexity.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Theorem 1
We first define some notations. Without loss of generality, let
be the set of matched (PT, PR) pairs at the conclusion of the algorithm. We first consider p 1 =(PT 1 , PR 1 ), with the preference list at the conclusion of the algorithm denoted by i.e., no (PT, PR) and (ST, SR) pairs will be matched respectively with a (ST, SR) and (PT, PR)
pair not on its preference list.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is by contradiction. Denote μ prop as the stable matching produced by the proposed algorithm, and μ alt as another stable matching. Then let us assume that for all (PT, PR) pairs, the utility achieved under μ prop is less than the utility achieved under μ alt . W.l.o.g, consider (PT , PR ), and thus the previous statement mathematically implies that 
C. Proof of Theorem 2
We outline the proof for non-stable matchings, and note that the proof for stable matchings follows directly from Lemma 1. The proof is by contradiction. Denote μ prop as the matching produced by the proposed algorithm, and μ opt as an arbitrary non-stable matching. Then let us assume that every matched (PT, PR) pair in μ prop achieves a utility less than its utility obtained under matching μ opt . thus have a zero utility. However, at least one of these (ST, SR) pairs, denoted as (ST q , SR q ) will obtain a positive utility under μ opt . Combined with the initial contradiction assumption, this implies that (ST q , SR q ) and (PT μ † opt (q) , PR μ † opt (q) ) form a blocking pair for μ prop , which is a contradiction.
Mathematically, this is represented by {U
,μ † prop ( ) (ξ prop ,μ † prop ( ) , β prop ,μ † prop ( ) )<U ,μ † opt ( ) (ξ opt ,μ † opt ( ) , β opt ,μ † opt ( ) )} L μ prop =1 ,
D. Proof of Theorem 3
From MA-Step 2-2-1-a-i and MA-Step 2-2-2 of the proposed algorithm in Table II, 
PT will not decrease its time-slot allocation number to β ,q =β min ,q − , since its minimum rate requirement will not be satisfied. Thus the minimum possible time-slot allocation number that PT will not make any offer to any ST, and according to MA Step 2-2-3, PT will be removed from the list of unmatched PTs denoted by MATCH in Table II . Thus the maximum number of iterations that all the PTs will be removed from MATCH is given by
E. Proof of Theorem 4
Following the proposed algorithm in Table II, 
F. Proof of Lemma 2
For the centralized method when L PU L SU , the proof follows by noting that the total number of matching combinations between the PTs and STs is
, while the complexity of solving the linear programming problem for all possible matching combinations is 2 2L SU +L PU [43] . A similar argument can be made when L PU >L SU . For the proposed algorithm, the proof follows by noting that the complexity is proportional to the total number of times the PTs communicates with the STs, given in (17) . For the RMBN method, the proof follows by noting that each PT communicates to a random ST only once, and thus the complexity is proportional to the number of primary users L PU .
